

## Message Text

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ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 EUR-12 ARA-10 NEA-10 CIAE-00  
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SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 DHA-02 ACDA-07 MC-02  
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R 180700Z JUL 77  
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4871  
INFO USCINCEUR  
SECDEF WASHDC/OASD/ISA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 KHARTOUM 2361

FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MASS, SU  
SUBJECT: FY79 SECURITY ASSISTANCE ASSESSMENT: SUDAN

REF: STATE 133136

### INTRODUCTION

1. BEFORE RESPONDING TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS REFTEL, WISH TO  
NOTE THAT USG PRESENTLY ENGAGED IN INTENSIVE REVIEW US-SUDAN  
MILITARY RELATIONS. AFTER DWINDLING ALMOST TO NOTHING  
BETWEEN 1967 AND 1976, WE NOW HAVE ACTIVE IMET PROGRAM,  
REGULAR USN VESSEL VISITS AND HAVE DETERMINED THAT SUDAN  
ELIGIBLE TO PURCHASE US MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES  
UNDER FMS. SALE OF SIX C-130S HAS BEEN APPROVED. RECENTLY,  
WE DECIDED REESTABLISH DAO HERE. HOWEVER, EXACT DIMENSIONS  
MILITARY SALES RELATIONSHIP HAVE NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN  
DEFINED. THIS PROBLEM CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW, AND DURING  
REMAINDER FY 77 AND FY 78 US POLICY RE ARMS SALES TO SUDAN  
SHOULD BECOME CLEARER. NOT POSSIBLE NOW TO SAY EXACTLY  
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WHAT USG WILL OR WIL NOT SELL SUDAN, HOWEVER, FOR PURPOSES  
THIS REPORT WE SHALL ASSUME SOME REASONABLY SIZEABLE ARMS  
SALES RELATIONSHIP WILL EXIST BY FY 79.

2. US INTERESTS: EMBASSY DISCUSSED US INTERESTS IN SOME  
DETAIL IN KHARTOUM 1981 (EXDIS) OF JUNE 15. IN BRIEF US  
INTEREST IN SUDAN BASED, IN FIRST INSTANCE, ON ITS POTENTIAL

AS MAJOR FOOD PRODUCER IN FOOD DEFICIENT POST-1980 WORLD. MOREOVER, OTHER ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, INCLUDING POSSIBILITY OF MAJOR PETROLEUM DEPOSITS, WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY LEAD TO SUDAN BECOMING MAJOR MARKET AND LOCUS OF INVESTMENT FOR US WHILE ALSO BEING INCREASINGLY SIGNIFICANT SOURCE OF RAW MATERIALS AS WELL AS FOOD. IN ADDITION, SUDAN'S SIZE AND GEOGRAPHIC POSITION, ITS MODERATE POLICIES, ITS REGIONAL ROLE AS BRIDGE BETWEEN ARAB AND AFRICAN WORLDS, AND ITS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH OUR MOST IMPORTANT ARAB FRIENDS GIVE IT A POLITICAL IMPORTANCE WHICH WILL GROW AS ITS ECONOMY DEVELOPS AND AS US INTERESTS IN REGION EXPANDS.

3. IN RECENT YEARS SUDAN HAS BEEN HOBBOLED BY ECONOMIC AND SECURITY PROBLEMS. WITH ANTICIPATED LARGE INFLOW ARAB (AND OTHER) INVESTMENT AND AID FUNDS -- WHICH ALREADY HAS BEGUN -- AND NOTICEABLE MOVES AWAY FROM SOCIALISTIC EXPERIMENTS OF LATE SIXTIES AND EARLY SEVENTIES, THERE NOW IS RISING HOPE THAT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS CAN BE OVERCOME. HOWEVER, IF THIS IS TO BE, INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY MUST BE MAINTAINED. MOREOVER, INTERNAL SECURITY CLOSELY RELATED TO FOREIGN THREAT (SEE BELOW). THEREFORE, US SECURITY ASSISTANCE ROLE CLOSELY RELATED TO PRESERVATION LONG TERM ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS HERE.

4. FOLLOWING SUB-PARAS ADDRESS QUESTIONS IN CORRESPONDING SECTIONS PARA 4 REFTEL.

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A. FOREIGN THREAT: SUDANGOV BELIEVES THAT DE FACTO ALLIANCE HAS EMERGED INCLUDING LIBYA, ETHIOPIA AND USSR AS WELL AS THEIR FRIENDS SUCH AS CUBA. EACH COUNTRY FOR ITS OWN REASONS WANTS TO SEE NIMEIRI REGIME REMOVED FROM POWER. IN CASE OF USSR, SUDANESE LEADERS BELIEVE THIS PART OF BROADER STRATEGY TO CONTROL NILE BASIN AND IT ALSO ENTAILS OVERTHROWING SADAT REGIME IN EGYPT. LIBYA, ETHIOPIA AND USSR WILL, AS WAS DONE IN 1976, ACTIVELY SUPPORT SUDANESE DISSIDENTS ABROAD AND WOULD SUPPORT THEIR EFFORTS OVERTHROW NIMEIRI. THUS, FOREIGN THREAT DIRECTLY RELATED TO INTERNAL SECURITY/STABILITY NIMEIRI REGIME. SUDANGOV IN ATTEMPTING TO MEET THREAT HAS EXPELLED ALL SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS FROM COUNTRY, ENTERED INTO FORMAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT AND INFORMAL AGREEMENT WITH SAUDI ARABIA, IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH SUCH COUNTRIES AS SOMALIA AND KENYA, AND MADE MAJOR EFFORT ENLIST SUPPORT CHINA, EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND US. IT HAS EMBARKED ON MAJOR EFFORT UPGRADE ITS MILITARY DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES WITH SUBSTANTIAL SAUDI FINANCIAL SUPPORT. ON BALANCE EMBASSY BELIEVES SUDANESE THREAT ASSESSMENT IS ACCURATE. ALTHOUGH DEPARTMENT BELIEVES SUDANGOV CONCERN OVER SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

IS PERHAPS OVERDRAWN, THERE IS NO GAINSAYING THAT LIBYANS AND ETHIOPIANS WITH SIGNIFICANT SOVIET SUPPORT HAVE ATTEMPTED IN PAST TO OVERTHROW NIMEIRI OR HAVE SUPPORTED THAT EFFORT. NOR IS THERE ANY INDICATION THAT SUDAN'S THREE PRINCIPAL ANTAGONISTS WANT ANY LESS TODAY TO GET RID OF NIMEIRI. MOREOVER, THREAT IS COMPLICATED BY ERITREAN PROBLEM, AND SUDANGOV FEARS INTERNAL CIVIL WAR IN ETHIOPIA SPILLING OVER INTO SUDAN, WHERE WELL OVER 100,000 ETHIOPIAN REFUGEES LIVE.

B. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: SUDANGOV HAS RELATIVELY MODEST PLANS REGARDING ITS ARMED FORCES. BASIC PROBLEMS ARE THAT COUNTRY TOO LARGE AND RESOURCES TOO LIMITED FOR IT TO DEVELOP FORCES WHICH CAN DEFEND ALL BORDERS. THEREFORE,  
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ALTHOUGH THERE NO RPT NO INTENT TO DEVELOP OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY, IT IS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP MOBILITY. THUS EMPHASIS ON TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS. OTHERWISE, INTEREST IS TO IMPROVE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. SUDANGOV PROBABLY LOOKS FORWARD TO SOMEWHAT LARGER ARMY OF 50,000 TO 60,000 MEN AND IMPROVED BUT SMALL AIR FORCE AND NAVY. APART FROM BORDER DEFENSE, PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF ARMY IS DEFENSE OF REGIME AGAINST ANY ATTEMPTS TO OVERTHROW IT. EMBASSY BELIEVES US INTERESTS WARRANT SUPPORTING IT LIMITED DEGREE SUDANESE EFFORT IMPROVE ITS DEFENSE AND TRANSPORT CAPABILITIES.

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-----097399 181002Z /15

R 180700Z JUL 77  
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4872  
INFO USCINCEUR

SECDEF WASHDC/OASD/ISA

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 KHARTOUM 2361

FROM AMBASSADOR

C. PRIORITY: SUDANGOV WILL WISH CONTINUE PROFESSIONAL TRAINING UNDER IMET, AND IT WILL WANT EXPAND TRAINING LEVEL (CURRENTLY AT \$100,000 PER YEAR), IF POSSIBLE. IT WOULD LIKE TO HAVE US EQUIPMENT. IF FMS CREDITS WERE AVAILABLE, SUDANGOV WOULD PREFER THIS OPTION, BUT SUCH AN EVENTUALITY SEEMS UNLIKELY. THEREFORE IT WILL WANT TO MAKE FMS CASH PURCHASE. IN SOME CASES COMMERCIAL SALES WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. MOST IMPORTANT FOR SUDANESE IS TO HAVE ACCESS TO US EQUIPMENT. FMS RELATIONSHIP ALSO IMPORTANT, BUT IF ONLY WAY EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE IS BY COMMERCIAL SALES THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. DEPENDING ON WHAT WE MAY HAVE AGREED TO SELL OR NOT SELL DURING FY77-78, SUDANESE WILL WANT F-5 INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT, HELICOPTERS, EARLY WARNING RADAR AND PROBABLY HAWK MISSILE SYSTEMS, IF POSSIBLE. FAST PATROL BOATS AND ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS HAVE ALSO BEEN MENTIONED. THESE ITEMS WOULD BE USED FOR DEFENSE AND/OR MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS NOTED ABOVE. IN GENERAL US PURPOSES WOULD BE SERVED FOR REASONS NOTED ABOVE. HOWEVER, BIGGEST PROBLEM -- APART FROM US DOMESTIC INHIBITIONS AGAINST MAKING ARMS SALES GENERALLY, THAT IS, SECRET

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APART FROM A PRIOR RELUCTANCE TO SELL US ARMS TO COUNTRIES SUCH AS SUDAN -- IS UNCERTAINTY THAT SUDANESE ARE TECHNICALLY CAPABLE OF OPERATING AND MAINTAINING MORE SOPHISTICATED ITEMS. EMBASSY NOT ABLE AT THIS TIME TO MAKE THAT JUDGEMENT FOR ALL SYSTEMS, NOR CAN WE SAY WHETHER LESS ADVANCED, LESS COSTLY ALTERNATIVES THAT WOULD BE MILITARILY ACCEPTABLE ARE AVAILABLE. WE BELIEVE THAT FROM SUDANESE POINT OF VIEW REQUIREMENTS NOTED ABOVE ARE NOT RPT NOT UNREASONABLE.

E. ECONOMIC IMPACT: THIS DISCUSSED IN MORE DETAIL IN KHARTOUM 2199. IN BRIEF PERCEIVED THREAT HAS ALREADY REQUIRED SUDANGOV TO GIVE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO DEFENSE, AND THEREFORE SOME DIVERSION OF RESOURCES AWAY FROM DEVELOPMENT CAN BE EXPECTED. HOWEVER, OVERALL IMPACT SHOULD BE LESS THAN WHAT MAY BE EXPECTED SINCE (A) ECONOMIC GROWTH LARGELY RELATED TO FOREIGN, PARTICULARLY ARAB, INVESTMENT WHICH IS UNRELATED TO DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND (B) SAUDI ARABIA IS LIKELY TO FINANCE MUCH IF NOT ALL MILITARY PURCHASES FROM US. MOREOVER, AS SUDANESE ECONOMY GROWS, IT SHOULD BE ABLE ABSORB

HIGHER LEVEL DEFENSE SPENDING.

F. USG PRESENCE: NUMBERS OF USG AND CIVILIAN CONTRACT PERSONNEL REQUIRED IN-COUNTRY WILL DEPEND ON SPECIFIC ITEMS SOLD. SALE OF SIX C-130 TRANSPORTS EXPECTED REQUIRE 2 USG AND 4 CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL HERE FOR AT LEAST TWO YEARS. IF, SAY, F-5S AND HELICOPTERS WERE SOLD TOTAL WOULD PRESUMABLY REMAIN LESS THAN 50 AMERICANS. EMBASSY FRANKLY DOES NOT KNOW HOW MANY AMERICANS SALES OF SUCH ITEMS WOULD ENTAIL. THIS WOULD PROBABLY  
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BE ABOUT SAME AS NUMBER OF USG-SPONSORED AID PERSONNEL IN COUNTRY BY EARLY 1980'S. TOTAL AMERICAN COMMUNITY BY EARLY 1980'S SHOULD BE CLOSE TO 1,000 IF EXPECTED GROWTH OF US BUSINESSMEN AND FAMILIES OCCURS. GIVEN SIZE OF COUNTRY AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WHICH EXIST -- WHICH ARISES IN PART FROM SUDANESE DESIRE FOR MILITARY COOPERATION -- AND GENERALLY FRIENDLY ATTITUDE TOWARD EXPATRIATE PERSONNEL IN SUDAN, THERE SHOULD BE NO UNUSUAL PROBLEMS HERE, APART FROM THOSE GENERALLY EXPERIENCED DUE TO GEOGRAPHICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN SUDAN.

G. OTHER SOURCES. POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT SOME ITEMS LIKELY TO BE REQUESTED WILL BE AVAILABLE FROM OTHER SOURCES. FOR EXAMPLE, SUDAN AIR FORCE KNOWN TO BE LOOKING AT SEVERAL DIFFERENT HELICOPTERS. SIMILARLY, CROTALE (FRENCH) OR RAPIER (BRITISH) SAM SYSTEMS MAY BE ALTERNATIVE TO HAWK SYSTEM. EMBASSY ENCOURAGES COORDINATION AND COOPERATION AMONG WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. US INTERESTS SERVED BY IMPROVING DEFENSE OF SUDAN FROM WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE REAL AND SERIOUS THREAT. FOR COMMERCIAL AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS REASONS, WE WOULD PREFER SALES TO GO TO US FIRMS, AND SUDANESE WOULD PREFER US EQUIPMENT FOR TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL REASONS. HOWEVER IF POLITICAL REASONS DICTATE OUR NOT RPT NOT SELLING, SAY, HAWK MISSILES, EMBASSY BELIEVES US INTERESTS WOULD BE ADEQUATELY SERVED BY SALE OF BRITISH OR FRENCH SYSTEM. EACH CASE WILL HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY, AND WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER ONE SYSTEM REALLY IS ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR PROPOSED US SYSTEM. FYI: WE ASSUME NO NORTHROP, LOCKHEED OR RAYTHEON REP, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD BE WILLINGLY CONCEDE THAT EUROPEAN EQUIPMENT IS TRULY SATISFACTORY SUBSTITUTE FOR HIS COMPANY'S PRODUCT, AND SUDANESE MILITARY WOULD PROBABLY AGREE. END FYI.

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ANSWER DEPENDS ON SEVERAL TECHNICAL OR SUBJECTIVE FACTORS.

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R 180700Z JUL 77  
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4873  
INFO USCINCEUR  
SECDEF WASHDC/OASD/ISA

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 KHARTOUM 2361

FROM AMBASSADOR

H. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT: SUDANESE EQUIPMENT  
IN JUST ABOUT EVERY CATEGORY, EXCEPT PERHAPS WITH  
RESPECT TO SAMS, IS INFERIOR TO THAT WHICH EXISTS  
IN ETHIOPIA AND LIBYA AND EACH OF WHOM HAS BETTER AND  
MORE EQUIPMENT AND EACH OF WHOM HAS READY JSCSS  
TO EVEN MORE EQUIPMENT TO BE SUPPLIED BY SOVIETS  
OR OTHERS. SUDAN'S FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS, EGYPT  
AND SAUDI ARABIA, ALSO HAVE BETTER AND MORE  
EQUIPMENT. THUS EQUIPMENT BEING SOUGHT BY  
SUDANGOV WILL NOT RPT NOT INTRODUCE FOR FIRST  
TIME ADVANCED MILITARY SYSTEMS INTO NORTHEAST  
AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST REGION.

I. HUMAN RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN  
SUDAN, OF COURSE, PARTLY FUNCTION OF OVERALL  
CULTURAL TRADITIONS, HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE AND  
LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT ALL OF WHICH HAVE LIMITED  
DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY AMERICAN STANDARDS.

STILL, SUDAN, THOUGH NOT FREE IN OUR SENSE OF TERM,  
IS NOT RPT NOT A TYRANNY EITHER. AS SECURITY  
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SITUATION IMPROVES, SUDANGOV LIKELY ALLOW GREATER  
MEASURE OF FREEDOM. RECENTLY THERE EVIDENCE  
SUDANGOV RELASING POLITICAL PRISONERS. IF USG  
EXPANDS RELATIONS HERE, INCLUDING IN MILITARY AREA,  
IT WOULD GIVE US GRREATER LEVERAGE TO SEEK FURTHER  
HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS. TO HOLD BACK ON ARMS  
SALES AT THIS STAGE, HOWEVER, WOULD MORE LIKELY  
LESSEN SUCH LEVERAGE.

J. ARMS PURCHASE RESTRAINT: SUDANGOV IS NOT  
EAGER TO EXPAND ARMED FORCES MORE THAN NECESSARY.  
IT HAS NO RPT NO OFFENSIVE DESIRES AND DOES NOT  
WISH TO EXPAND ITS TERRITORY. IT WOULD BE DELIGHTED  
TO SEE LIBYA AND ETHIOPIA REDUCE THEIR MILITARY  
INVENTORIES AND PRESUMABLY WOULD GLADLY SUPPORT  
EFFORTS TO THIS END. HOWEVER, SINCE THESE  
ANTAGONISTS ALREADY HAVE SUPERIOR EQUIPMENT AND  
SINCE SUDANESE WANT DEFENSEIVE ITEMS ONLY, SUDANGOV  
WOULD NOT RPT NOT UNDERSTAND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO  
LIMIT ARMS PURCHASES UNDER DISCUSSION.

K. IMET: EMBASSY FULLY CONCURS WITH EMPHASIS  
ON PROFESSIONAL AND MANAGEMENT TRAINING UNDER IMET,  
AND THESE ARE AREAS CURRENTLY BEING SUPPORTED BY  
SUDAN IMET PROGRAM. NO IMET EQUIPMENT RELATED  
TRAINING EXISTS OR IS ANTICIPATED. SUDANGOV  
WILL PURCHASE EQUIPMENT RELATED TO TRAINING UNDER FMS.  
SUDANGOV DOES PAY KHARTOUM/LONDON/KHARTOUM TRAVEL  
COSTS TO MAXIMIZE TRAINING AVAILABLE UNDER IMET.

5. AMBASSADOR'S CONCLUDING SUMMARY COMMENT: SUDANGOV  
WISHES US SUPPORT AS IT ATTEMPTS MEET WHAT IT VIEWS  
AS SERIOUS THREAT FROM SOVIET-BACKED REGIMES IN  
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LIBYA AND ETHIOPIA. US HAS INTEREST IN HELPING  
MODERATE GOVERNMENT HERE ASSURE ITS INTERNAL  
SECURITY SO THAT IT CAN PROCEED WITH ECONOMIC  
DEVELOPMENT WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE OF PARTICULAR  
IMPORTANCE NOT ONLY TO US BUT TO WORLD OVER REMAINDER  
TWENTIETH CENTURY. AS PART OF OVERALL POLICY  
DECISION TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH SUDAN,

MODERATE EXPANSION MILITARY COOPERATION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. IMET PROFESSIONAL TRAINING AND SALE NON-LETHAL ITEMS SHOULD PRESENT NO PROBLEMS. SIMILARLY, IT WILL BE EASY TO DECIDE NOT RPT NOT TO SELL HIGHLY OFFENSIVE LETHAL EQUIPMENT OR HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT BEYOND SUDANESE CAPABILITY TO OPERATE OR MAINTAIN. HOWEVER, THERE IS A MIDDLE CATEGORY INCLUDING F-5S, HELICOPTERS, APCS AND PERHAPS SUCH OTHER ITMES AS TOW MISSILES (FOR WHICH THE SUDANESE HAVE NOT YET ASKED) WHICH MORE DIFFICULT. EACH CASE WILL HAVE TO BE DECIDED ON ITS OWN MERITS AND IN LIGHT EVOLVING REGIONAL AND LOCAL SITUATION. BERGUS

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## Message Attributes

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